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WHOSE INDEPENDENCE? CABO VERDEAN-AMERICANS AND THE POLITICS OF
NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF CABO VERDE (1972-1976)
Abel Djassi Amado
Professor of Political Science
Simmons University
ABSTRACT
In this paper, I argue that anti-colonial politics in the late colonial period of Cape Verde
had an important diasporic content. During the 1960s, Cabo Verde began a long, increasingly
violent effort to attain independence from Portugal (finally achieved in 1975). Diasporic Cabo
Verdeans in the US responded in surprisingly variable ways to the political resistance claiming
their national homeland. In this paper, I focus on responses by two political groups that emerged
as central in the Cabo Verdean diaspora: the PAIGC-USA Support Committee and the Juridical
Congress of World Cape Verdean Communities. I argue that these two groups constituted a
political reification of important socio-ideological cleavages that emerged within the global Cabo
Verdean community from the 1960s. The fall of Portugal’s fascist regime (Estado Novo) in
1974, and the subsequent independence agreement with the African Party for the Independence
of Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde (PAIGC), crystalized these political differences. The zenith of
intra-community, politico-ideological conflict corresponded to the Juridical Congress’
declaration of independence of Cabo Verde--in reaction to what many viewed as a grab for
power by the PAIGC. In short, at a key moment in Cabo Verdean history, diasporic citizens
exercised critical agency in seeking to influence, and even shape, the volatile political landscape
in their homeland.
Keywords: PAIGC-USA Support Committee; Juridical Congress of World Cape Verdean
Communities; Diaspora Politics; Cabo Verdean Independence Politics.
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Introduction
On December 18, 1974, the Government of Portugal and the African Party for the
Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde (PAIGC) signed what became known as the
Lisbon Agreement, which initiated a process for Cabo Verde to achieve independence from
Portugal seven months later (on July 5, 1975). The independence agreement translated into the
de jure political predominance of the PAIGC and the silencing of political forces that opposed
the views of that liberation movement. By the end of 1974, the Union of the Peoples of the
Islands of Cabo Verde (UPICV) and the Democratic Union of Cabo Verde (UDC)—the two
parties that engaged in direct competition with the PAIGC during the second half of 1974—were
simply wiped out of the political chessboard. 1 In the months leading to the formal proclamation
of the independence of Cabo Verde, the epicenter of opposition politic against the PAIGC shifted
from Cabo Verde to Cabo Verdean communities abroad, chiefly in the United States.
The PAIGC’s ascension to power on the islands crystalized the socio-political split
among Cabo Verdean diaspora, with clearly discernible groups engaging in either a alliance
politics or an opposition politics vis-à-vis the homeland. 2 In the mid-1970s, two important
political formations were the key actors in the politics of national independence of Cabo Verde
among Cabo Verdean-Americans, namely the PAIGC USA-Support Committee and the Juridical
Congress of World Cabo Verdean Communities. Apart from ideological differences, the
leadership of these two political groups represented the socio-political fragmentation of the
community in the late 1960s and 1970s. Cabo Verdean community was a fragmented community
along the issues of social classes, racial and ethnic identity, and generation.
In this paper, I want to advance three main points. First, Creole diasporas extend to their
host country their homeland’s socio-identitary disputes and imaginings. 3 That is to say, socially
fragmented diasporic communities are likely to fashion diverse—if not mutually antagonistic—
political projects for their homeland. Second, diverse sections of the diasporic community
develop distinct political projects. Third, organized factions of the diaspora resort to a myriad of
political instruments and strategies to connect with foreign, international and transnational actors
in order to legitimize and further entrench their own political views and perspectives.

José André Leitão da Graça, Golpe de estado em Portugal: traída a descolonização de Cabo Verde! (Praia, Cabo
Verde: Edição do Autor, 2004); José Vicente Lopes, Cabo Verde: os bastidores da independência (Praia: Spleen,
2002).
2
Michel S. Laguerre, Diaspora, Politics, and Globalization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 40.
3
I use the term “Creole diaspora” in reference to the recent history of immigration of Creole peoples throughout the
Atlantic World. Creole diaspora, as such, different-generations of peoples living and settling abroad from Cabo
Verde, the key group under study, Jamaicans, and Haitians, to cite the best-known cases. In other words, the term
applies to fragments of creole societies living abroad. Their creole condition, historically at the intersection of
African and European civilizations, allow them to easily navigate in cultural landscape of Western world as well as
to negate essentialized identity imposed onto them. Thus, for instance, both Cabo Verdeans and Haitians in the
United States often reject their identity attachment to the African-American community. On this matter see, Marilyn
Halter, Between race and ethnicity: Cape Verdean American immigrants, 1860-1965 (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois
Press, 1993); Regine O. Jackson, “The Uses of Diaspora among Haitians in Boston,” in Geographies of the Haitian
Diaspora, ed. by Regine O. Jackson (New York and London: Routledge, 2011), 137. Though the term Creole
diaspora might give the sense of a monolithic social experience shared by these creole societies, the reality is the
opposite. Thus, one can find the cases of recent or modern diaspora (Cabo Verdeans) and incipient diaspora
(Jamaicans and Haitians), if one uses the typology proposed by Gabriel Sheffer. For more on this, see Gabriel
Sheffer, Diaspora politics: at home abroad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 75.
1
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Theoretical Framework
In a study of diaspora politics concerned with social behaviors and institutions created by
diasporic citizens who aim to shape and alter political outcomes in their homeland, it is helpful to
start by addressing the concept of diaspora. “Diaspora” is essentially a contradictory concept, as
the term entails both dispersion and unity: it refers to the international spread of human
communities that, at the same time, sustain a principle of symbolic or real unity through
emphasizing common ancestry and national origin. 4 Like any other sociological entity,
diasporas are imagined communities. 5 Political and social actors, chiefly those who command
both cultural and material capital, may develop and disseminate a variety of narratives,
discourses, and perspectives to explain and sustain the essence of that community. Diaspora
communities imagine themselves in respect to their homeland, with which they maintain direct
or symbolic relationships. In this regard, Michel Laguerre distinguishes between an “active”
diaspora, whose members maintain actual ties to the homeland, and a “passive” diaspora, whose
members develop only symbolic ties with the homeland. 6 Within the same diasporic community,
one may encounter sub-groups that maintain different kinds of ties and contacts (real or
symbolic) with the homeland. In spite of the difference between these ties with the homeland,
these different subgroups of a diaspora may remain engaged in a constructive discourse with
their homeland—and among themselves.
The term ‘diaspora,’ which derives etymologically from Greek (speiro = to sow, and dia
= over) was initially applied to the Jewish social condition of historical dispersion from
Palestine. 7 Since the twentieth century, the term has been stretched to include the experiences of
other national and ethnic groups dispersed in different countries. The concept of diaspora entails
the notion of organic and substantial connection, real or imagined, with the homeland. 8
Homeland, like other forms of collective identity, is not static; different sections of homeland
society often engage in a debate on what constitutes actual national identity. Dominant
perspectives—and their challenges—on national identity migrate along with migrants. Diaspora
views on the identity of the homeland structures and influences their political attitudes and
actions towards their homeland.
Diasporas, as argued by Paul T. Zeleza, are basically discourses, insofar as they form a
catalog of narratives about self and homeland. 9 Reaffirming their socio-identitary uniqueness
within the context of the hostland entails the development of a discourse on the homeland. In
such an endeavor of producing a narrative on the nation/homeland, diaspora groups
symbiotically interact and clashes with views on the homeland produced by their fellow public
intellectuals and activists both in the homeland and hostland. The concept of nation may,
On the notion of diaspora, see Eliezer Ben-Rafael, “Diaspora” Current Sociology 61, no. 5–6 (September 2013):
842–61. doi:10.1177/0011392113480371.
5
Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (London: Verso.
2016).
6
Michel S. Laguerre, Diasporic Citizenship: Haitian Americans in Transnational America (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1998), 8.
7
Gabriel Sheffer, Diaspora politics: at home abroad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 9; Milton J.
Esman, “Diaspora and International Relations,” in Modern Diaspora in International Politics, ed. Gabriel Sheffer
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 333.
8
Lisa Anteby-Yemini and William Berthomière, “Diaspora: A Look Back on a Concept” Bulletin Du Centre De
Recherche Français À Jérusalem 16 (2005): 262-270.
9
Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, 2005. “Rewriting the African diaspora: beyond the Black Atlantic,” African Affairs, 104,
414 (2005): 35-68.
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likewise, be considered a “tradition of argumentation,” as John Shotter has argued. 10 As for the
notion of the collective self, several different and contradictory perspectives prevail. And, as for
the tradition of argumentation, like most other social and cultural products, that travels along
with migrants and settles among diasporic communities. Dominant perspectives on collective
social identity in the homeland are adopted and crystalized by those in the diaspora who maintain
strong linkages with that homeland.
In the enterprise of imagining a diasporic community, cultural and political entrepreneurs
may interact and negotiate with a myriad of social groups and communities from at least three
different geocultural spaces: the homeland; the mainstream sector of the host society; and
marginalized groups of that host society. Most obviously, both direct contacts and symbolic ties
with the homeland inform how diasporic groups imagine themselves and their nation. Events in
the past constrain and limits the choices in the present, creating, thus, a path dependence. Times
of political crisis present opportunities to break political and social path dependence; as such,
these moments may permit new visions of the nation to arise. Such altered conceptualizations of
the homeland may result from a myriad of factors, ranging from social class, generation, direct or
symbolic contact with the homeland, and contact with excluded groups of society, to assimilation
into the mainstream community of the host nation. Diaspora politics connects both the homeland
and the host country through formal organizations, which are basically political tools through
which “‘diasporic politicians’ stress both the welfare of the community and their attachment to
homeland affairs as an important incentive of their political participation in the hostland political
process.” 11 In other words, through community-based and/or broader political organizations,
diasporans seek to influence political outcomes in the homeland. Put differently, diasporic
citizens engage in long-distance nationalism. Ultimately, while living away from their
homeland, diasporans’ strategic political engagements focus on producing particular political
outcomes in that homeland.
Despite the foregoing generalizations, it is important to emphasize that diasporas are not
monolithic socio-political entity. Although their members derive from the same homeland and
often share a combination of values and symbols, ranging from language and culture to other
critical social elements, diasporic communities are fragmented; different social cleavages, such
as social classes, generation, and even region from the homeland whence groups come, tend to
create fractures; often, these divisions become politicized.
In contemporary times, diasporic citizens typically develop a myriad of organizations and
networks, through which they base their cultural and political activities. 12 These organizations
constitute significant political tools, conferring a number of advantages to their members,
ranging from the pooling of resources to being a mark of political modernity. These diasporic
political organizations have three audiences in mind. First, they engage in internal
communication, as they seek to represent what they perceive to be the view of the community
they belong. In a way, these organizations tend to see themselves as a microcosmic
representation of their community. Second, they seek to engage with the host country’s
government and/or its political leadership. As they are rarely able to shape policies through
electoral politics or conventional political participation, given their numerically size, diasporans

John Shotter, Cultural politics of everyday life: social constructionism, rhetoric and knowing of the third kind
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993).
11
Laguerre, Diaspora, Politics, and Globalization, 3-4.
12
Ben Rafael, “Diaspora,” 843.
10
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often resort to a strategy of ethnic lobbying as the vehicle through which they might influence
policies. Beyond these local efforts, the last audience of these organizations is the homeland.
Diasporic communities engage in a dynamic process of imaging the nation. As diasporas
are not sociologically monolithic, their different segments advance different—and sometimes
contradictory—interpretations of the nation. When a given narrative of the nation becomes
dominant, sections of the diaspora that do not endorse such an interpretation mobilize many
types of resources—human, material, and symbolic—to disseminate a counter-narrative,
designed to undermine and subvert the perceived dominant narrative about the nation. Through
political organizations and actions, including ethnic lobbying before different levels of the host
nation’s government, different components of the diaspora will seek to influence the debate on
the nation and its political future.
On the Cabo Verdean Diaspora in the United States
Although the literature on the Cabo Verdean diaspora is quite rich and robust, studies on
the Cabo Verdean diaspora and/or immigration tend to be carried out almost exclusively by
anthropologists, historians, and demographers. 13 These studies tend to emphasize the cultural
aspects of the diaspora and/or to trace the history of its origin and development. Few studies yet
exist on Cabo Verdean diaspora politics: perhaps because few political scientists have written on
the relations between Cabo Verde and its diaspora, scant attention have been to the role that the
latter has played in defining and shaping politics in the former.
The historical process of diasporization of Cabo Verdean people developed in relation to
distant geographies, namely the Portuguese colonial empire (of which the islands were a
constituent part until their independence in 1975), along with the wider Atlantic world. Colonial
policies, coupled with harsh natural and climatic conditions, compelled Cabo Verdeans to seek
life alternatives elsewhere. From the mid-nineteenth century, the Portuguese colonies of São
Tome and Principe, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau were the main destinations to Cabo Verdean
migration. Since the late nineteenth century, and particularly during the early twentieth century,
thousands of Cabo Verdeans migrated to other destinations, such as Brazil, Argentina, the United
States, Senegal, and, later, other Western European states such as France, Italy, United Kingdom,
and the Netherlands. 14
Almost a century ago, Albert Jenks wrote that in cataloguing the history of immigration
to the United States, the history of Cabo Verdeans constituted its “curious chapter.” 15 In fact, the
presence of Cabo Verdeans in the United States has been traced back to the late 1600s or early
1700s, beginning with the trans-Atlantic whaling industry. 16 However, mass migration of Cabo
Verdeans to the United States expanded significantly in the late nineteenth century, peaking in
Luís Batalha and Jørgen Carling, ed., Transnational archipelago perspectives on Cape Verdean migration and
diaspora (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2008); Deirdre Meintel, “Cape Verdean Transnationalism, Old
and New,” Anthropologica 44, 1 (2002): 25-42; Halter, Between race and ethnicity; G.S. Gibau, “Diasporic Identity
Formation among Cape Verdeans in Boston,” The Western Journal of Black Studies, 29, 2 (2005): 532-539; Laura J.
Pires-Hester, “The Emergence of Bilateral Diaspora Ethnicity Among Cape Verdean-Americans,” in The African
Diaspora: African Origins and New World Identities, ed. Isidore Okpewho, Carole Boyce Davies, and Ali A.
Mazrui (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), 485-503. António Carreira, The people of the Cape
Verde Islands: exploitation and emigration, trans. Christopher Fyfe (London: C. Hurst, 1982)
14
Carreira, The people of the Cape Verde Islands; Batalha and Carling, Transnational archipelago.
15
Albert Jenks quoted in Halter, Between race and ethnicity, 1.
16
Carreira, The People of the Cape Verdean Islands.
13
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the 1910s and 1920s. As Deidre Meintel has pointed out, the late nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the last century constituted a period of intensive transnationalism, with some twenty
thousand Cabo Verdeans entering the US in the first two decades of the twentieth century,
alone. 17
Cabo Verdeans were probably the first Africans to voluntarily mass-migrate to the United
States. In fact, the notion of voluntary migration to the US has been a dominant trope among
Cabo Verdeans and Cabo Verdean-Americans, often presented as a sign of collective
distinctiveness and source of pride. 18 Migration to the United States has occupied a central place
in the group’s collective subconscious, and many public intellectuals have connected the Cabo
Verdean diaspora with the socio-economic and cultural advancement of Cabo Verdeans more
generally.
For a variety of reasons, migration from Cabo Verde to the United States declined
significantly from the 1920s onwards. New immigration policies in the United States during the
late 1910s and early 1920s made it difficult for the islanders to move to the United States. The
period from the 1920s to the 1960s corresponds to what Deidre Meintel calls “the retreat of Cabo
Verdean transnationalism.” 19 During this period, contacts with the homeland became scarce and
the Cabo Verdean community in the New England turned into itself. The few contacts that
existed were carried out mostly through trans-Atlantic trade via packet ships. As historic
homeland, Cabo Verde became a symbolic entity, a distant place whence the ancestors came.
By the 1960s, the key sites of presence of Cabo Verdeans in the United States were
southern Massachusetts and Rhode Island. Towns and cities such as New Bedford, Wareham,
and Boston (in Massachusetts), and Providence and Pawtucket (in Rhode Island), became hubs
of Cabo Verdean communities in the United States. While excluded by the mainstream AngloSaxon society as well as the local Portuguese communities, most Cabo Verdean immigrant
communities in New England also rejected any type of identification with African-Americans.
“Creole” social identity was carefully deployed as a tool to distinguish them from African
Americans. Identity labels such as “Bravas,” “Black Portuguese,” and later “Cape Verdean,”
were devices deployed to highlight social differences and distance between the immigrants of
Cabo Verde and African-Americans—in spite of the fact that many among Cabo Verdeans
shared phenotypic characteristics with African Americans. 20
Second- and third-generation Cabo Verdean-Americans were more attuned to the civil
rights movement of the U.S., and the overall political environment and discourses of the
1950s/60s. The quest for equality and de facto citizenship resonated with many Cabo Verdeans,
who experienced similar socio-economic and political plights to those of African-Americans.
The context of the civil rights movement and the development of the more radical Black Power
movement greatly shaped political behaviors and attitudes of young Cabo Verdeans. The social
atmosphere of the civil rights movement and more radical Black activism of the late 1960s and
early ‘70s influenced young Cabo Verdean-Americans in two main ways. First, at the level of
identity politics, many began to accept and even proudly display Blackness. Second, the political
Meintel, “Cape Verdean Transnationalism,” 31-33; Halter, Between race and ethnicity, 38; 41.
Halter, Between race and ethnicity; Raymond Anthony Almeida, Cape Verdeans in America: Our Story. (Boston:
The American Committee for Cape Verde, Inc. 1978).
19
Meintel, “Cape Verdean Transnationalism.”
20
Halter, Between race and ethnicity; Gina Elizabeth Sanchez, Diasporic [trans]formations: race, culture and the
politics of Cape Verdean identity, Unpublished PhD Dissertation (Austin: University of Texas at Austin, 1999), 83;
Sidney M. Greenfield, “In Search of Social Identity: Strategies of Ethnic Identity Management Amongst Cape
Verdeans in Southeastern Massachusetts,” Luso-Brazilian Review 13, 1 (1976): 10.
17
18
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atmosphere in the United States of the 1960s contributed to ethnic revival among a variety of
ethnic groups that make up the social fabric of the country. Like other groups, Cabo VerdeanAmericans began to imagine Cabo Verdean-ness—now named, Caboverdeanidade—as a
condition of their singularity. 21
In the decades following the end of the Second World War through the 1960s, political
engagement among different segments of the Cabo Verdean community in New England
oscillated between a politics of acquiescence and a more contentious politics. As anticolonial
armed struggle erupted in the former Portuguese colonial empire in Africa, the Portuguese
regime developed a sophisticated and well-orchestrated public diplomacy designed to conquer
the hearts and minds of Americans, Portuguese-Americans, and Cabo Verdean-Americans. 22 In
the senior generation of Cabo Verdeans, the Portuguese government found valuable allies to
disseminate a message promoting unity of the empire. In the late 1960s, as an indication of the
ideology of a pluricontinental and pluri-racial Portuguese Nation, the Portuguese government
invited Belmira Nunes Miranda, Attorney Roy Teixeira Sr., and Judge George Leighton—three
well-known and respected members of the Cabo Verdean community in the United States—for a
tour of two key spaces in the empire, Angola and Mozambique. These personalities became
interlocuteurs valables for the empire and used their social and symbolic capital to disseminate a
message emphasizing the unity of the Portuguese nation—hence, arguing against
independence—across its colonial empire. For instance, Belmira Nunes Miranda, the only
woman who accompanied the group, wrote for several months for the local community
newspaper, The Cape Verdean, reporting on the wonders of the empire.
By contrast, the next generation imported and adapted to social strategies, discourses, and
organizations developed in the context of the civil rights movement. In fact, many young Cabo
Verdeans joined and even led some radical Black American organizations. For instance, Salah
Matteos, a second-generation Cabo Verdean-American, became involved with the organization
led by Malcolm X in the first half of the 1960s and, through that organization, became aware of
the ongoing armed struggles for independence in Africa. 23 Frank “Parky” Grace, a secondgeneration Cabo Verdean-American, led the Black Panther Party chapter in the city of New
Bedford, Massachusetts. 24
Manuel T. Neves, the founder and editor of The Cape Verdean, indicated his annoyance
over, and displeasure with, the fact that many young Cabo Verdean-Americans had adopted the
language and symbols of Black Power movement. 25 Yet, civil rights and Black Power
movements were one of the main avenues through which Cabo Verdean ethnic and diaspora

21
Marlyn Halter, “Cape Verdeans in the U.S.” in Transnational Archipelago. Perspectives on Cape Verdean
Migration and Diaspora, ed. Luís Batalha and Jørgen Carling (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1008), 3546.
22
Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black liberation: The United States and white Africa, 1948-1968 (Columbia:
University of Missouri Press, 1985), 74; Vasco Ribeiro, “Lobistas, assessores de imprensa e relações-públicas norteamericanos que serviram o Estado Novo (1942-1974),” Media & Jornalismo 19, 35 (2019): 56.
23
Personal Communication with Sallah Matteos, November 5, 2019.
24
Jama Lazerow, “A Rebel All His Life”: The Unexpected Story of Frank “Parky” Grace, in In search of the Black
Panther Party: new perspectives on a revolutionary movement, ed. Jama Lazerow and Yohuru R. Williams
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 104-157.
25
Manuel T. Neves, “Power Struggle among Cape Verdeans in New Bedford,” The Cape Verdean, May 1969, 1;
See also the letter to the editor by the Portuguese Consul, Jorge de B.A. Freitas, “Letter to the Editor,” The Cape
Verdean, January 1971.
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politics developed. 26 For its part, the Portuguese government’s official position was to limit, if
not completely nullify, the political influences of the Black Power movement among Cabo
Verdean-Americans. In a letter to the editor that he published in The Cape Verdean in 1971, the
Portuguese General Consul (Jorge de B. A. Freitas) argued that “Black Power is the movement
of Black Americans—and Cabo Verdeans are Luso-Americans.” 27
In short, the presence of Cabo Verdeans in the United States has a long history. In the
United States, Cabo Verdeans have come to understand that their ideas about race, informed by
the Portuguese racial ideology, did not match those prevalent in the United States, where the
dominant racial ideology is that of a binary (white v. non-white), significantly distinct from the
idea of racial continuum practiced in Portuguese empire. Older generations of Cabo Verdeans
tended to cling to this racial ideology and rejected any type of identification with AfricanAmericans. By the 1950s and ‘60s, the new generation of Cabo Verdean-Americans, born and
raised in the United States, began to accept and adopt their blackness.
Diaspora Politics of National Independence: Organizations, Actors, and Ideologies
In the months following the April 1974 Carnation Revolution in Lisbon, which brought
an end to the 41-year right-wing dictatorship called the Estado Novo, a vibrant and heated
political debate about the nation ensued among Cabo Verdeans both at home and in the United
States. Several socio-political groups were formed, each advocating for a different understanding
of what would constitute the Cabo Verdean nation and its destiny, in light of the ongoing process
of decolonization of the Portuguese colonial empire. The idea of diaspora leads to the
assumption of it being a monolithic social entity, when in reality it is rather a diverse and eclectic
collection of groups, with each holding its own understandings and imaginings—sometimes,
internally contradictory—of the homeland, its culture, its future, and its destiny. As argued by
Cape Verdean-American anthropologist G. S. Gibau, Cabo Verdeans in the US are fragmented,
characterized by identity conflict. 28 By the late 1960s and early ‘70s, Cabo Verdean-Americans’
social differences produced a strikingly diverse set of perspectives on the essence and future of
the homeland. These diverse perspectives manifested themselves through the formation of two
main political groups: the PAIGC-USA Support Committee, and the Juridical Congress of World
Cape Verdean Communities.
Founded in the late 1950s, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and
Cabo Verde (PAIGC) was a political organization made up of Cabo Verdeans and GuineanBissauans engaged jointly in the politics of national liberation of their two then-Portuguese
colonies in West Africa. In the early 1960s, as it became clear that Portugal resisted dismantling
its colonial empire peacefully, the PAIGC developed an intense political campaign to mobilize
Cabo Verdeans and Guineans both at home and abroad.
The idea of establishing a cell and/or a support committee of the PAIGC in the United
States dates back to the beginning of the armed struggle for national liberation. In the early
1960s, the leadership of the PAIGC began to cultivate relationships with Cabo Verdeans residing
in the United States. A small number of Cabo Verdeans in the United States, who met regularly
to discuss the prospects of Cabo Verdean independence in light of the ongoing decolonization in
Salahudin Matteos, “The Cape Verdeans and the PAIGC Struggle for National Liberation: An Interview with
Salahudin Omowale Matteos,” Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies, vol 3, 3 (1973): 43-48.
27
Jorge de B. A. Freitas, “Letter to the Editor,” The Cape Verdean, January 1971.
28
Gibau, “Diasporic Identity Formation.”
26
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Africa, contacted the headquarters of the PAIGC in December 1961. 29 A few months later, the
party appointed Pedro Pires, then the leader of the PAIGC bureau in Dakar, Senegal, as the
contact person with the Cabo Verdean diaspora in the United States. 30 From 1961-63, there were
regular exchange of letters and other forms of communication between the PAIGC and members
of the Cabo Verdean diaspora in the United States. 31 In 1962, during a visit to the United States,
the leader of the PAIGC, Amilcar Cabral, met with Cabo Verdeans and proposed a political
organization called the Associacão Hesperitana to serve as an auxiliary member of the movement
he led. 32 However, this effort did not result in any concrete political linkage.
Ten years later, a small group of young Cabo Verdean-Americans, led by Salah Matteos,
founded the PAIGC-USA Support Committee. Like many of his companions, Matteos, had
political training in the context of the U.S. civil rights movement, and through his active
participation in the radical struggle for dignity and equality of African-Americans. As Amilcar
Cabral himself recognized early, the struggles of African-Americans and colonized Africans
have long been connected. 33 Through his early engagement in the former, Matteos became aware
of the struggles for African liberation. In 1972, Matteos travelled to West Africa to join the
liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau. The PAIGC leadership advised him to return to the USA
and form a support committee. That idea had support from Cabral, who, in his last visit to the
United States, argued for the necessity to create a PAIGC Support Committee.
The PAIGC USA-Support Committee was an organization independent from the party’s
political structures: the members of the support committee did not constitute party cadres or
members. Rather, they were essentially committed sympathizers to the party’s ideology and
cause. In the history of the PAIGC, there were other support committee created that aggregated
immigrant communities (e.g., the support committee in Côte d’Ivoire in 1963). 34 The Support
Committee purported to function like a transmission belt between the party leadership and the
diaspora community. The main task of the organization was to engage in campaigns of
mobilization and information, so as to instill political awareness among Cabo Verdean
Americans of the ongoing struggle for national liberation that was taking place in GuineaBissau. 35 In late 1973, the PAIGC-USA Support Committee began to publish No Pintcha
(Bissau-Guinean Creole for “let’s move”), a newspaper that served as a vehicle to disseminate
news from the PAIGC, updates on the ongoing liberation struggle in Guinea-Bissau and Cabo
Correspondence from Dulce Alves to Aristides Pereira, 26 December 1961, Fundação Mário Soares / DAC Documentos Amílcar Cabral, http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms_dc_38444 (2020-10-25)
30
Correspondence from Aristides Pereira to Pedro Pires, 13 January 1962, Fundação Mário Soares / DAC Documentos Amílcar Cabral, http://hdl.handle.net/11002/fms_dc_37261 (2020-10-25)
31
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Verde, and political news from the community in the United States. No Pintcha was a trilingual
newspaper featuring articles, opinions and other pieces in Cabo Verdean Creole, Portuguese and
English. No Pintcha ultimately became a forum for the promotion of the political ideals of the
PAIGC, chiefly that of national independence and the political unity between Cabo Verde and
Guinea-Bissau.
Additionally, the Support Committee was instrumental in mobilizing resources, both
symbolic and material, from different sections of mainstream American society. For instance,
Salah Matteos, the chair of Mobilization and Organization Section of the PAIGC-USA Support
Committee, led a campaign before the United Church of Christ (UCC) in May 1974; that
convention which took place in Hyannis, Massachusetts, resulted in the UCC recognizing the
Republic of Guinea-Bissau as an independent nation. 36 Beyond this explicitly political goal, the
support organization’s work also addressed other key issues, ranging from education and social
awareness, demonstrations and rallies against Portuguese interests, to contacts with other
organizations in the United States.
Furthermore, the PAIGC-USA Support Committee was socially and politically integrated
in ethnic politics and coalition-building. Leaders of the committee were either members of and/or
worked closely with III Pyramids, Inc., a multi-ethnic coalition of non-governmental
organization founded by Cabo Verdeans, African-Americans, and Native Americans in 1969.
The PAIGC USA-Support Committee also engaged in coalition- building with other mainstream
progressive groups. Its leader, Salah Matteos toured US universities to campaign on behalf of the
PAIGC struggle in Africa. Taking advantage of its connection with other progressive
organizations, in 1973 the PAIGC USA-Support Committee secured a substantial grant
($18,000.00) from the Episcopal Church, through its General Convention Special Program. 37 In
the first half of the 1970s, the PAIGC-USA Support Committee was instrumental in creating one
of the most durable myth abouts Cabo Verdeans in the USA, namely that the size of the
community was about 300,000. 38
Just as the PAIGC gained momentum and seemed unstoppable in its quest to gain power
in Cabo Verde, in early 1975, a new political organization was created by Cabo VerdeanAmericans: the Juridical Congress of World Cape Verdean Communities. Two socio-political
factors explain the dynamic process that led to the formation of this second group: the December
18 Agreement between the Government of Portugal and the PAIGC, and a trip by a Cabo Verdeborn Portuguese diplomat (Aguinaldo Veiga) to the United States.
The December 18 Agreement, which marked the fall of the Portuguese dictatorship, was
itself linked to the anti-colonial war in Guinea-Bissau, coordinated by the PAIGC. In August
1974, Portugal recognized Guinea as an independent nation. Following this development,
Portugal and the PAIGC began to discuss possible modalities for Cabo Verde to, likewise,
achieve independence. On December 18, 1974, Portugal and the PAIGC reached a political
agreement in Lisbon. While the Lisbon Agreement did not translate into a direct transfer of
power from Portugal to the PAIGC, it was, nonetheless, a significant political victory for the
party, insofar as other Cabo Verdean political parties, such as the Union of the Independent
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Peoples of Cabo Verde (UPICV) and the Democratic Union of Cabo Verde (UDC), had not
made it to the independence talks. A new government of transition was appointed by the
independence agreement, and it included representatives appointed by the PAIGC.
Many Cabo Verdeans, both at home and in diaspora, distrusted the PAIGC. The
somewhat radical political line of the party included a number of principles that alienated many
Cabo Verdeans. First and foremost, the PAIGC meant an ideological rupture with how the social
identity of Cabo Verde had been constructed by the nation’s literati since the early 1900s. A
dominant trope shared by the islands’ writers and poets was the assumption that Cabo Verde was
fundamentally linked to the culture and civilization of Europe in general, and Portuguese in
particular. Baltazar Lopes da Silva, the epitome of the generation of writers that became known
as the “Claridosos,” writes of Cabo Verde as a “romance experience in the tropics.” 39 Against
this Western-based interpretation of Cabo Verdean social identity, Amilcar Cabral, the leader of
the PAIGC, suggested what he termed “African regionalism.” In this model, the people of Cabo
Verde were culturally African. Such an identity statement had political implications, as it
removed Cabo Verde from the sphere of Western influence and instead made a case for it to be
included in the concert of African states. Another central principle of the PAIGC—which
constituted, at the same time, a key political objective—centered on the political unification
between Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau. In fact, this idea had been codified in major documents
of the party since its inception in the late 1950s and early ‘60s. 40
Beyond this specific goal, the PAIGC espoused a leftist, radical political ideology that
included elements of Marxist thought. During the liberation struggle, the PAIGC developed
strong linkages with the Communist states, which provided valuable material, diplomatic and
political support. 41 Portugal was a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a
military alliance that included most of the Western European and North American States. As
such direct support for the nascent state seeking independence from Portugal was never
forthcoming from the Western states. Indeed, to the Portuguese regime, the PAIGC was no more
than a puppet organization in the service of international communism—the Soviet bloc.
The independence agreement with the PAIGC meant the victory of a particular
interpretation of Cabo Verdean identity. Many Cabo Verdeans saw the PAIGC as a catalog of
things that they despised and/or rejected, ranging from pan-Africanism and political unity with
Guinea-Bissau to international Communism and anti-liberal democracy. Many believed that
Guinea-Bissau would eventually join the ranks of communist regimes; for this reason, the fear
of a communist takeover in Cabo Verde was another main reason that many Cape Verdeans
rejected the idea of political unification with Guinea-Bissau. Especially for Cabo Verdean elites
living in the diaspora, the PAIGC was basically a stooge of Soviet imperialism, and they worried
that independence with PAIGC in charge of the new government would translate into a
Communist regime taking hold on the islands.
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A further factor concerned global diplomatic relations. At a time that the Cold War was
entering into its post-détente phase, Cape Verdean opponents of the PAIGC hoped the antiCommunist argument could have helped win political support from the US government. In fact,
according to XX, the official line of the US government in 1975 was that “we don’t want a base
[in Cabo Verde], but we don’t want the Russians to have it either.” 42 It was against these
perceptions that the Juridical Congress was eventually formed by a small number of conservative
Cabo Verdean lawyers living in the United States.
A second major factor that drove the founding of the Juridical Congress was the arrival of
the Portuguese diplomat, Aguinaldo Veiga, in the United States. Born in Cabo Verde, Veiga
made his career in the Portuguese imperial bureaucracy. In 1961, he was part of the Portuguese
diplomatic delegation to the United Nations. During a visit to the United States in 1961, Veiga
met some elites of the Cabo Verdean diaspora living in Massachusetts and Rhode Island. 43
Following the crumbling of the dictatorship in Portugal, in October 1974, Veiga published a
short book about the politics of independence in Cabo Verde. 44 The book was a rejoinder to the
PAIGC ideological line, criticizing those who argued for “total and immediate independence” for
Cabo Verde, whom he called “impatient Cabo Verdeans.” 45 Furthermore, Veiga bitterly
criticized the idea of a post-colonial unification between Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau--a
project he considered contradictory, as it would lead to “independence in dependence,” as he
characterized this model. 46
By the end of 1974, with the independence agreement reached, national debate changed
from whether or not to seek independence, to what kind of national independence to embrace.
Like many other political actors who were initially opposed to the idea of national independence,
Veiga, began to focus on ways to preempt the PAIGC-led quest for independence from
establishing a new government. Already, the PAIGC seemed to have an almost unstoppable
momentum in its dynamic process of occupying the seat of power in Cabo Verde. To challenge
that momentum, in December 1974, Veiga moved to the United States with a mission to swing
the Cabo Verdean-American communities away from supporting that seeming likelihood. Veiga
decided to move to the United States because of the size and relative prestige he believed the
Cabo Verdean community in the United States had. For him, the Cabo Verdean community in
North America was large and powerful enough “to speak up for the natives in the islands.” 47
The Juridical Congress Unilateral Declaration of Independence
In early February 1975, Aguinaldo Veiga met with Roy Teixeira, Belmira Nunes Lopes,
Joseph Andrade and Ben Goncalves met in Sacramento, CA. There, the group discussed the idea
of creating a new association. 48 They decided to form an organization named the Juridical
Congress of World Cape Verdean Communities. The name was carefully chosen to reflect two
predominant characteristics of the organization. On the one hand, the leadership of the
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movement rested in the hands of lawyers. On the other hand, the organization aimed to attract
representatives of Cabo Verdean diasporas from around the world.
On February 22 and 23, the Juridical Congress held a conference at the Sheraton Hotel in
Boston. The conference was led by five lawyers, aided by an advisory body of twenty people
(seventeen men and three women). Reports indicate that over 2,500 people attended the
meeting—it was, to date, the largest event ever held of Cabo Verdeans in the United States. 49
The meeting produced a “Resolution” that consisted of ten different points, which can be
organized under the rubric of five different themes: (a) a declaration of “total and immediate
independence” from Portugal (I); (b) the illegality and unconstitutionality of the prior
Independence Agreement reached between Portugal and the PAIGC (II and III); (c) the denial of
Portuguese sovereignty, and the claim that if Portugal maintained armed forces stationed in Cabo
Verde, that would constitute an “invasionary force” (IV and V); (d) an assertion that both the
PAIGC and Guinea-Bissau were enemies of the people of Cabo Verde, hence the transitional
government in Cabo Verde was illegitimate (VI-VIII); and (e) the predominance of the attorneys
within this political organization (IX-X).
The conference centered on three main topics: first, legal deconstruction of the Lisbon
Agreement, signed on December 18, 1974; second, the resolution of a motion calling for the
independence of Cabo Verde; and, finally, the organization of a government-in-exile. The
conference centered on the legal deconstruction of the independence agreement with the
members of the congress arguing but ultimately approving, a motion that declared the
Independence Agreement between the Government of Portugal and the PAIGC legally void. This
argument was based on the notion that one of the contracting parties in the agreement, the
PAIGC, lacked legitimacy and mandate from the people of Cabo Verde. The final resolution
stated that the PAIGC was “a foreign political group that never was elected, chosen, or accepted
by the Cape Verdian [sic] people.” 50 For the Juridical Congress, the PAIGC was a foreign
political organization originating and based in Guinea-Bissau. The notion of the PAIGC being a
foreign body was something previously defended by Veiga, weeks before the meeting. In an
open letter to the United Nations, Veiga had protested the PAIGC’s foreign activities in Cabo
Verde. 51 In fact, the Resolution of the Juridical Congress classified the PAIGC as “an
invasionary force and an enemy of the People of Cabo Verde.” 52
Following the legal nullification of the Lisbon Agreement, the Juridical Congress voted
to “proclaim and herewith effectively declare the total and immediate independence of the
archipelago of the Cape Verde.” 53 The Juridical Congress’s unilateral declaration of
independence, though without any real political implications for Cabo Verde, was part of a
strategy of preempting the PAIGC’s political takeover and subsequent redefinition of the nation.
Lastly, the Resolution of the meeting called for the establishment of a government-inexile that would seek recognition from friendly states around the world. The Congress granted
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and Aguinaldo Veiga” the mandate to speak on behalf of Cabo Verde and its people. 54 As a
visual representation meant to powerfully symbolize the constitution of a new government in
absentia, the Juridical Congress also approved a new symbol of the state—a flag—which was
then blessed by a Cape Verdean Catholic priest present at the conference (Reverend Father
Benvindo Leitao).
Beyond these instrumental political goals, the Juridical Congress aimed to fundamentally
define the socio-political identity of Cabo Verdeans both at home and abroad. Against the PanAfricanist views on the identity of Cabo Verdeans, which was gaining traction in the 1970s, the
movement sought to return to the Eurocentric approach to Cabo Verdeanness. This attempt was
hardly uncontroversial. In fact, many Cabo Verdean-Americans saw the meeting as an
unwelcome attempt to strengthen a Eurocentric emphasis of Cabo Verdean identity. Yvonne
Smart is one participant who disagreed with the platform. At the meeting, she perceived a basic
identity conflict between a “Eurocentric” and “Afrocentric” emphasis. As a Cabo VerdeanAmerican associated with the Black Empowerment movement of the time, Smart and others
attending the meeting, rejected the Juridical Congress leaders’ views. Smart described her
group’s emphasis quite simply: “we were Afro-centric.” 55
The meeting did not go unnoticed by the PAIGC-USA Support Committee. On the first
day of the meeting, the group brought some one hundred bodies, who protested outside the
Sheraton Hotel on a cold, winter day. The protest included speeches by the leaders of the
organization, including Salah Matteos. The PAIGC-USA Support Committee also issued a
written statement that classified the meeting as an attempt of diasporic elites to safeguard their
material interests, as well as to sow confusion and division within the Cabo Verdean
community. 56
In the following months, as the process for independence began to take shape in the
homeland, both groups of Cabo Verdean-Americans devised a number of different political
strategies to either strengthen or weaken the position of the PAIGC in Cabo Verde. Part of the
strategy followed by the Juridical Congress included ethnic lobbying before members of federal
legislative and executive bodies. Thus, in April 1975, Aguinaldo Veiga and Roy Teixeira, Jr.,
traveled to Washington, D.C., where they met with representatives from several congressional
offices from New England states, California and Florida. 57
Meanwhile, in Boston, the two groups focused their attention on winning support from
local representatives of the Cabo Verdean diaspora. In order to better learn about the situation,
Senator Edward Brooke called for a meeting with the representatives of the two organizations
and other stakeholders on April 18, 1975, in his office in the JFK Building. During the meeting,
Brooke mentioned that the U.S. Congress had appropriated some five million dollars to Cabo
Verde. The representatives from the Juridical Congress responded by suggesting that the
distribution of the aid be trusted to an impartial agency such as the Red Cross. For their part, the
PAIGC-USA Support Committee wanted to learn about the official position of the U.S.
government vis-à-vis independence, but Senator Brooke did not provide much information.
Overall, the meeting was a political defeat for the Juridical Congress insofar as their strategy of
linking the PAIGC to the Soviet Union failed miserably. The idea that the PAIGC-Lisbon
Agreement was an indication of its satellite status vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was rejected by
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Senator Brooke, who mentioned that even the U.S. government had its own agreements with the
Soviet Union. 58
At this point, the first post-independence election was approaching. In this politically
momentous climate, the strategy of the Juridical Congress shifted toward more toward
international law. The leaders’ idea was to take their case before an international court. 59 Veiga
argued that the upcoming election in Cabo Verde had no legitimacy, and that the independence
of Cabo Verde had to be confirmed in the Hague. 60
The Juridical Congress had both a negationist and a constitutive agenda. On the one hand,
it negated the legality, legitimacy and constitutionality of the independence agreement between
Portugal and the PAIGC. Through its resolutions and speeches by its leaders, it became clear that
the group’s objective was to seek the nullification of that independence agreement in an
international court. On the other hand, the Boston conference supposedly invested a new
sovereign state, with a government in exile and the sorts of key political symbols, such as a flag
and a coat of arms, that are expected as part of modern statehood. 61
After the formal independence of Cabo Verde, the Juridical Congress managed to
maintain its political activity for another year or so. By the end of 1975, however, many
members grew disappointed with the Juridical Congress. In a penetrating editorial in December
1975, Manuel Neves, whose reporting in the early months of that year. Had clearly been biased
in favor of that organization, condemned the Juridical Congress, noting that “nothing has been
accomplished.” 62 The organization became dysfunctional, with mismanagement of funds and
distrust eventually leading to its political insignificance and eventual dissolution.
In fact, by the end of 1976, both the organizations I have been discussing here had
vanished from the diasporic political scene--though for opposite reasons. The PAIGC-USA
Support Committee disappeared because it had fulfilled its mission. By contrast, the Juridical
Congress disappeared because it was unable to generate support for its members’ quest to
challenge the PAIGC’s leadership in achieving independence and statehood of Cabo Verde. By
the late 1970s, few members of the Juridical Congress maintained their opposition to the postcolonial regime in Cabo Verde. They maintained an engagement in opposition politics by
joining forces with other dissenters, leading to the formation of another association, the Cabo
Verdean Independent and Democratic Union (UCID).
Conclusions
Independence politics in the homeland have an effect among diasporic citizens. In the
modern world, those citizens may use a myriad of strategies and institutions to shape political
outcomes in their homeland. Among Cabo Verdeans in the United States, two main political
organizations were formed at a critical moment in the homeland’s political life. The PAIGCUSA Support Committee was restricted to the diasporic sites of southern New England (New
Bedford and Boston areas) and maintained mostly symbolic connections with the homeland, as
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its leaders were born in the United States and had no direct contacts with Cabo Verde. By
contrast, the Juridical Congress was a coalition of Cabo Verdean elites from more dispersed
diasporic sites ranging from New England to California—though it never attracted diasporic
communities from beyond the US.
At the sociological level, the leadership of these two political organizations represented
two distinct social categories of Cabo Verdeans in the United States. The PAIGC-USA Support
Committee was led by young, high-school-dropout, second-generation Cabo Verdean-Americans
who had close links with African-Americans and their struggle for social equality. The PAIGCUSA Support Committee adopted ideological stances of Pan-Africanism and imagined CaboVerdeanness in relation to blackness and Africanity. For its part, the leadership of the Juridical
Congress consisted of highly educated Cabo Verdean-Americans, many of whom were born in
Cabo Verde (Aguinaldo Veiga, Roy Teixeira) and had material interests in the islands (Roy
Teixeira). The Juridical Congress maintained the traditional colonial discourse of Cabo Verde as
a mestizo, “creole” society in which the vestiges of African culture have long been diluted, as
argued by the Cabo Verdean intellectual, Baltazar Lopes da Silva. 63 This group was convinced
that focusing on cultural and/or political connections to Africa would be tantamount to
committing cultural genocide of the Cabo Verdean people.
Unexpectedly, these dramatically opposed ideological and social distinctions translated
into divergent political projects for the homeland. For the older generation associated with the
Juridical Congress, political independence represented. By contrast, for the young generation
affiliated with the PAIGC-USA Support Committee, political independence under the aegis of
the PAIGC represented a political victory of an African people against European colonialism.
The intense debate and campaigns regarding the political independence of Cabo Verde
served to stir the community in the search of its self. Several other community organizations
were created, or old ones became redesigned, to focus on claiming the uniqueness of Cabo
Verdean identity. These organizations engaged mainstream political institutions with the goal of
altering the perception towards the community as well as to give the community a voice in how
it is perceived. For instance, through the work of the Cape Verdean Educators Collaborative, the
Cape Verdean language became recognized as a ‘living foreign language,’ and thus a medium
for bilingual education. 64 Similarly, the laborious lobbying and political activities conducted by
the Cape Verdean Veterans Association of New Bedford ultimately resulted in the census of
1980 recognizing ‘Cape Verdean’ as an ancestry classification. 65
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